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et al.: Colonial Patents and Open Beaches

Open Beaches

COLONIAL PATENTS AND OPEN BEACHES
I.

INTRODUCTION

To the east .of Manhattan, stretching out over one hundred
miles into the Atlantic, lies Long Island. On its South Shore, from
Brooklyn to Montauk Point, there exist some of the most beautiful, sandy ocean beaches in the world. On the North Shore are
the peaceful, secluded and rocky beaches of Long Island Sound.
These beaches seemingly constitute an ideal recreational facility
for the entire metropolitan area.
For many people, however, a trip to the beach, far from being
a pleasant experience, is a horror of traffic jams on the highways
and severe overcrowding on the beach itself, assuming one is fortunate enough even to find a place to park. The solution to this
problem would clearly seem to be the opening of more public
beaches. The opposite has, in fact, occurred. Municipalities and
towns which hold title to many Long Island beaches, in reaction
to the increased number of beach users, have closed their beaches
to non-residents. Additionally, many localities own beaches
which have, in fact, never been open to non-residents.
It is ironic that beaches are becoming less accessible at a
point in history when Americans are acquiring increased amounts
of leisure time. Many American workers have long enjoyed the 35
hour week. Some firms are experimenting with four and even
three day weeks. It is not surprising then that, in recent years,
the amount and scope of open-beach litigation has increased.
Since 1965, decisions favorable to open-beach advocates have
been handed down in Texas1 , Oregon 2, California 3 , Florida4 , New
Jersey5 , and New York', with cases in the latter two states being
decided against municipalities which restricted their beaches to
residents only.
While most of the aforementioned decisions were rather narrow in scope, two were not. Those decisions affirmed substantial
rights to free beach access for all citizens of the respective states.
1. Gulf Holding Corp. v. Brazoria County, 497 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973);
Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
2. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
3. Gion v. Santa Cruz, 2 Cal.3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal Rptr. 162 (1970).
4. Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271 So.2d 765 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1972).
5. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d
47 (1972).
6. Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc.2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1972).
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The Oregon case, State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay7 , originated because of a controversy over a fence on a beach and ended with the
Supreme Court of Oregon stating that Oregon citizens enjoyed
customary rights to use the dry sand portion of all the beaches in
Oregon. In the New Jersey decision, Borough of Neptune City v.
Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 8 the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
while re-affirming the lower court decision that sea-side communities could not exclude non-residents, further stated that these
communities could not discriminate between residents and nonresidents in charging a fee for beach use. While these cases will,
no doubt, appear in the brief of every plaintiff in an open-beach
action, they do not reflect the state of the law in New York. Some
40 years ago the Appellate Division 9 was called upon to decide
whether New Yorkers had customary rights to use beaches which
were in private hands. The court, in a per curiam opinion, decided in the negative. It should also be noted that nowhere in
Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach," the most recent New York case
on the matter, does the court state that, absent certain circumstances, a municipality must open its beaches to non-residents.
Indeed, there are even legislative statements to the effect that a
town may restrict its beaches to residents.'"
As a result of the advancement of numerous theories for
opening restricted beaches in various jurisdictions, beach litigation presently enjoys a somewhat confusing posture in the law, no
theory having been found to have universal application. Indeed,
the future course of beach litigation appears to depend on a case
by case development, adjusting itself not only to the legal climate
of a given jurisdiction but to a given locality's historic and geographic development as well.
It will be seen that before one may formulate the legal theories requisite to open a particular beach, one must first be aware
of and understand its physical properties, particularly when dealing with New York beaches. Is the beach on the North Shore or
the South Shore of Long Island? To some this may seem a trivial
point. However, the answer to this question will limit or expand
7. 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
8. 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).
9. Gillies v. Orienta Beach Club, 248 App. Div. 623, 288 N.Y.S. 136 (2d Dept. 1936)
aff'g 159 Misc. 675, 289 N.Y.S. 733 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1935).
10. 69 Misc.2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
11. N.Y. Town Law § 143 (McKinney Supp. 1973), amending N.Y. Town Law § 143
(McKinney 1965).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss1/10

2

et al.: Colonial Patents and Open Beaches

Open Beaches
the legal arguments available to litigants. A beach on the South
Shore, for example, is subject to far more erosion or accretion
depending upon circumstances, than a North Shore beach, with
concommitant effects on title.
The distinction between North Shore and South Shore
beaches is equally important because of the existence of colonial
patents, the royal land grants to the freeholders of Long Island
townships. These grants, in many cases, extend out into Long
Island Sound so that title to the underwater lands is held, not by
the State, as is customary, but by the towns.
The existence of the colonial patents are presented by many
as a strong argument for keeping the beaches closed since the
towns do not administer the beaches for the State but actually
hold them in fee by reason of these land grants. Ironic though it
may be, modern day residents of New York State enjoy fewer
rights to beach enjoyment than did the citizens of ancient Greece
and Rome.' 2 It is contended, and perhaps rightly so, that the
colonial patents bind us to another place and another time, that
is, to 17th Century England and the despotic rule of the Stuarts.
Should we then sweep the patents aside as anathema to American
concepts of liberty? In fact, these ancient land grants have been
upheld for 300 years by the legislature and courts of New York.
As will be seen, their validity is settled and they have shown
remarkable resistance to judicial attack. Because of the power of
the patents, it must be realized that some North Shore beaches
held under title derived from colonial patents may never be
opened to the general public.
The "history" of a beach itself must be considered in the
formulation of certain other theories directed toward opening restricted beaches. By history, we mean the course of action taken
by the owner of the beach with regard to the classes of persons
permitted to use the beach. Were non-residents once permitted
to use the beach or were they never permitted to do so? The
former use may well lay the foundation for an action based on the
proposition that acquiescence in use by the general public may
imply an intention to dedicate the beach to that public.
Finally, it will become apparent that our options with regard
to beaches are limited by financial considerations. Clearly, a
state cannot simply take away private property without giving
12. See Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763 (1970).
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just compensation in return. Yet beachfront property is enormously valuable and it is doubtful that the State could obtain all
the beaches it needs through the exercise of its condemnation
powers. It should also be realized that any erosion prevention and
beach stabilization projects are also terribly expensive. If the resources of the federal government are brought into play to save
the beaches, what will be the legal ramifications for restricted
beaches which have accepted federal funds?
Barring the development of a universal theory or event which
will open all beaches to non-residents, the success of open-beach
litigation on Long Island will probably evolve on a case by case
basis. It is the purpose of this comment to analyze the various
issues likely to arise in these future cases, and to suggest the
outlines of new theories which may have to be developed and used
in this litigation.
II.

THE COLONIAL PATENTS

The colonial patents clearly present a formidable obstacle to
the proponents of open beaches and a comfortable feeling of security for those who would keep the beaches closed. Three hundred
years of history and custom stand behind the words of the patents, and their effect is not likely to be destroyed by one or even
by many direct attacks through litigation. As a matter of fact,
they are still viable weapons of attack themselves, as witness
their use in an action brought by a Long Island town to regain
title to patented land now being used by private individuals.13
Perhaps in the history of these patents there lies an explanation
for the continuing strength of this primary bulwark which must
be mounted or somehow skirted by those in favor of open beaches.
A.

History and Development of the Patents

On April 8, 1825, a fisherman named Rogers entered the
harbor of Oyster Bay and there caught and carried away one
hundred oysters. Rogers was subsequently sued by the Supervisor
of Oyster Bay before a justice of the peace for the recovery of a
penalty of $12.50. This was the fine designated by a town by-law
which proscribed the taking of oysters within town waters by nonresidents. Rogers challenged this by-law as being without foundation in law, alleging that shellfishing was a right common to all.
Responding to his challenge, the town produced a colonial patent
13. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1973, at 49, col. 7.
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dated the 29th day of September, 1677, granted by Sir Edmond
Andros, then Governor of New York, conveying to the townsmen
of Oyster Bay, among other tracts, the lands under the waters
within its jurisdiction in fee, "and all other profits and emoluments to the tract belonging, and all privileges and immunities
belonging to a township within the then government."' 4 Rogers
paid his fine.
Colonial patents to Long Island towns conveying underwater
land have been utilized time and again by municipalities to protect the coastal waters within their jurisdictions from various
encroachments. Originally intended as inducements to the farmers and craftsmen of England and Holland to settle the harbors
and havens of New York, these colonial land grants presently
form the basis of considerable municipal regulation of the affected coastline. This is so not only because such lands lie within
the jurisdiction of patented townships but also because the fee
vests in the municipality and not the State. The sources of title
by which the Town of North Hempstead had held underwater
lands in Hempstead Harbor and Manhasset Bay as fee owner
may illustrate the manner in which Long Island towns have acquired and sustained their titles.
The original grantors of the patents, the Dutch and English
sovereigns, derived their title from discovery and conquest. The
power of the Europeans to make such grants appears never to
have been open to serious question, despite the presence of their
predecessor-settlers, the Indians. Chief Justice Marshall, reviewing the power to convey lands so discovered or conquered observed in an early opinion that European discovererors, as a consequence of their acts of discovery and conquest possessed
a power to grant the soil, while yet in the possession of the
natives. These grants have been understood by all, to convey a
title to grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. '
14. Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. 237, 238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).
15. Johnson & Graham v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). Justice
Taney later observed in Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 403 (1842):
The English possessions in America were not claimed by right of conquest, but
by right of discovery. For, according to the principles of international law, as
then understood by the civilized powers of Europe, the Indian Tribes in the new
world were regarded as mere temporary occupants of the soil . ...
This being so, it was not surprising to find that titles based purely on grants from the
Indians, as opposed to grants from the early Dutch and English governors, were not
cognizable in law. See Town of Southhampton v. Mecox Bay Oyster Co., 116 N.Y. 1, 5-8,
22 N.E. 387, 388-89, 78 N.Y.S. 1, 4-5 (1889); Nance v. Town of Oyster Bay, 41 Misc.2d

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1974

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 10

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 2, 19741

The first settlers of Hempstead were principally Englishmen
who had emigrated across Long Island Sound from Connecticut
to cultivate the rich Hempstead plains and take shellfish in the
harbors of Hempstead's northern shores. The English yeoman
arriving in Hempstead did not take by discovery or from the
British sovereign but from the Dutch who had antedated the
English settlers in New Amsterdam.'" The United States Su7
preme Court has observed:'
If the discovery be made, and possession of the country be
taken, under the authority of an existing government, which is
acknowledged by the emigrants, it is supposed to be equally well
settled, that the discovery is made for the whole nation ... and
that the vacant soil is to be disposed of by that organ of the
government which has the constitutional power to dispose of the
national domains.
The governmental organ so authorized was the Dutch Colonial Governor, William Kieft, who, "by virtue of a commission
under the hand and seale of the high and mighty lords, the Estates Generalle,"'' on the 16th of November, 1644, granted a patent to the townsmen of Hempstead,
with their Heirs, Executors, Administrators, Successors or Associates . . . a certain quantity of Land, with all the Havens,
Harbors, Rivers, Creekes, Woodland, Marshes and all other
Appurtenances there unto belonging, lying and being upon.'"
The grant was more than just a conveyance, being a charter of
incorporation as well which extended "full Power and Authority,
upon the said Land to Build a Towne. . .and Authority to Erect
a Body Politique ...
",0
Twenty years later, a British expedition under Colonel Richard Nicholls was fitted out and dispatched to the New World.
It entered New Amsterdam harbor in the latter part of August,
1664 and, on September 4, Governor Stuyvesant reluctantly surrendered to the English forces. New Amsterdam became New
446, 244 N.Y.S.2d 916, 921 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1963).
16. M. FLINT, LONG ISLAND BEFORE THE REVOLUTION, A COLONIAL STUDY, at 124-29
(1967).
17. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 595 (1823).

18. E. B.

O'CALLAGHAN, LAWS AND ORDINANCES OF NEW NmERLAND,

1628-1674, at 42

(1868).
19. Id. at 42.
20. Id. at 43.
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York and Richard Nicholls its first English governor. 21
Seeking to secure the townsmen of Hempstead in their title
to the lands conveyed by the Kieft Patent, Governor Thomas
Dongan issued a patent to them on April 17, 1685, which granted
and confirmed to the patentees and their
Assigns forever all the before Recited Tract. . .togather with all
and singular the Woods, underwoods, Plaines, Meadows, Pastures, Quarryes, Marshes, Water Lakes, Causewayes, Rivers,
Beaches, fishing, Hawking, Hunting and fowleing with all Libertyes, Privilidges, Hereditaments and Appurtenances to the
said Tract of22Land and Premissess belonging or in any wise
Appurtaining.
The Kieft and Dongan Patents, then, were the principal
sources of title to the Town of North Hempstead. The effect of
Dutch-Roman law on the validity of the Kieft Patent was considered in Grace v. Town of North Hempstead,2 where the court
held the conveyance not violative of Roman Civil Law as it operated in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century. It is submitted, however, that even assuming arguendo that conveyance of
underwater lands under seventeenth century Dutch law was void,
the English confirmatory patents establish the grants as law
under the succeeding sovereign. These patents are part of the
common law of England which was controlling until the War of
Independence. Their treatment by the Colony and later, by the
State of New York, is of paramount importance in determining
the legal status of the colonial patents.2 4
During England's early history, the common law operated
under the assumption that the foreshore, or strip of land between
the high and low water mark, formed part of the seacoast manorial estates granted by the Crown. Whether the foreshore area
21. M. FLINT, LONG ISLAND BEFORE THE REVOLUTION, A COLONIAL HISTORY, 532 (1967).
22. F. VAN WYcK, LONG ISLAND COLONIAL PATENTS 159 (1935).
23. 166 App. Div. 844, 152 N.Y.S. 122 (2d Dept.), aff'd 220 N.Y. 628, 115 N.E. 1040
(1915).
After an examination of the legal sources of seventeenth century law, the Grace court
determined that under the laws in force in the Netherlands in 1644, a common right in
the lands under rivers and harbors could be granted by the government to private individuals. While Roman law had maintained the jus publicum, or public trust, in its waterways, the doctrine declined considerably in the ensuing centuries. By the seventeenth
century, Dutch legal scholarship would appear to indicate that the grants made by Dutch
colonial governors were not illegal, or even unusual. The court noted that Grotius, writing
in 1625, indicated that ownership of bays and estuaries was often included in the conveyance of private estates. Id. at 850, 152 N.Y.S. at 127.
24. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 366, 417-18 (1842).
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was prima facie in the Crown or presumed to be appurtenant to
the adjoining manor became the subject of considerable litigation
during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I and the Stuart Kings. 1
Definitive case law on the subject remained scarce until the
courts of England announced the rule that the foreshore belonged, prima facie, to the Crown." However, these judicial developments, taking place after the new state government replaced
the British colonial administration on April 20, 1777, did little to
clarify New York law regarding ownership of the foreshore.
Because of the paucity of case law in England and the fact
that no claim of prima facie ownership by the Crown was ever
pressed in the American colonies, decisional law in New York
came to rely heavily on works of legal scholarship in assessing the
respective rights of individual and sovereign in the foreshore. 7
The authority most often cited in this regard is the great seventeenth century Lord Chief Justice of England, Sir Matthew Hale.
25. Under the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, a certain Thomas Digges, a grantee of
several royal foreshore grants, represented the Crown's position of prima facie ownership
in several suits. Digges was notably unsuccessful in pressing his claims in the wake of
Constable's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1601), in which King's Bench held:
that the soil on which the sea flows and ebbs, between the high water mark and
the low water mark, may be parcel of the manor of a subject . . . so it was
adjudged in Lacy's Case, Trin. 25 El. in this Court. (emphasis added)
The Stuart Kings were considerably more successful than their Tudor predecessors
in establishing the prima facie theory of Crown ownership. Charles I, eager to fill the royal
coffers with revenue from the sale of England's foreshore, initiated an action in 1631 for
the removal of a pier which had been erected on the foreshore of the Thames by the upland
owner. King Charles was unsuccessful in this action but, after replacing the judges who
had ruled against the prima facie doctrine of Crown ownership, emerged victorious in the
notorious case of Attorney-General v. Philpot, reported only in S. Mooa, A HISToRY OF
THE FORESHORE, (1888). The Philpot decision was bitterly resented and may well have
contributed to Charles' overthrow.
26. Not until 1795 did the Court of Exchequer mitigate the uncertainty and declare
in favor of the prima facie theory of Crown ownership. In Attorney-General v. Richards,
145 Eng. Rep. 980 (Ex. 1795), the court, citing Lord Hale's treatise and observing that,
"It is clear that the right to the soil between the high and low water mark is prima facie
in the Crown", Id. at 983, went on to issue a decree ordering the removal of structures
erected on the foreshore by the defendants, imputing to them an invasion of the jus
privatum of the Crown.
By 1811 the doctrine of the jus publicum, coexistent with the jus privatum, was set
forth in Attorney-General v. Parmeter, 147 Eng. Rep. 345 (Ex. 1811), the court indicating,
"The private right of the Crown may be disposed of but the public right of the subject
cannot, even if it be within this grant." Id. at 352.
27. See, e.g., Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 287, 291,
91 N.E. 846, 847 (1910); Town of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N.Y. 74, 80, 80 N.E. 665, 667
(1907); People v. New York and Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 76 (1877); Romart
Properties, Inc. v. City of New Rochelle, 67 Misc.2d 162, 167, 324 N.Y.S.2d 277, 282
(Sup.Ct. Westchester County 1971).
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Sir Matthew's works on this subject formed the theoretical basis
of New York law of the foreshore as it developed after the American Revolution.
According to Hale's celebrated treatise, De Jure Maris,21 the
sovereign succeeded to the land under navigable waters in two
capacities-that of fee owner and that of trustee.
The theory of fee ownership has been designated the jus privatum and forms the basis of any right of alienation by the
Crown. Hale's theory of royal title in fee, or jus privatum is predicated on the privileges or "regalia" accorded to the king-by the
common law as powers incident to government and protection of
the realm.
This theory was never questioned in the century prior to the
American Revolution. Regarding the sovereign's prerogatives of
fee ownership, Blackstone indicates that:2
in England it hath always been holden that the king is lord of
the whole shore and particularly is the guardian of the ports and
havens ...
In addition, the King succeeded to all open lands as universal
occupant and original proprietor. It would appear, under the fictions of feudal law, that all real property having no acknowledged
owner is, in theory, vested in the King as the head and sovereign
representative of the nation. Bacon's Abridgement states:"0
The King by our law is universal occupant and all property
is presumed to have been originally in the Crown. . . . Hence,
it is said, that the King hath direct dominion; and that all the
lands are holden mediately or immediately from the Crown.
Since the King succeeds to title as part of his prerogatives
as sovereign and as universal occupant,31' according to Hale, the
land under water and in the foreshore
doth prima facie and of common right, belong to32 the King both
in the shore of the sea and the aims of the sea .
28. Reported only in S. MOORE, A

HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE

29. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
1825).
30. 5 M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT

(1888).
262-264 (16th ed.

OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

OF THE LAW 494 (6th ed. 1807).
31. Blackstone observes, ". .
whatever hath no owner vests in the King."
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra n. 29.
32. HALE, DE JURE MArS, Ch. 4, subd. 5, in S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FOPSHORE

(1888).
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While the King held the lands under water as the prima facie
owner in fee, he also held the foreshore area as sovereign for the
people of the realm. In this capacity as public trustee, the King
could convey such land but it would be subject to the rights of
the public for fishing and navigation, referred to as the jus publicum or the public trust.3 3 Hale explains
That the people have a public interest, a jus publicum of passage and repassage with their goods by water. . .For the jus
privatum of the owner or proprietor is charged with and subject
to the jus publicum which belongs to the King's subject; as the
soil of an highway is which, though in point of property it may
be a private man's freehold, yet it is charged with a public
interest of the people. ....
3.
The dichotomy of the Crown's ownership created by the jus
privatum and jus publicum appears to have been appreciated by
other authorities on English law during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Bacon's Abridgement lends support to
Hale's theory of the Crown's prima facie ownership stating that:"
"as the King hath a prerogative in the seas, so hath he likewise a
right to fishing and the soil. . . ." But while the sovereign "hath
a property right in the soil," 3 the author also recognizes Hale's
notion of the jus publicum stating: 3
But notwithstanding the King's prerogative in seas and navigable waters, yet it hath been always held, that a subject may fish
in the sea for this being a common right, . . . [it] cannot be
restrained by grant or prescription.
An examination of English law as it developed before and
subsequent to the colonial period, indicates that the notion of the
Crown's alienable, proprietary interest in underwater land and
the foreshore was recognized even though case law was sparse.
Hale's enunciation of the law of underwater lands indicates that
while the concept of the alienable jus privatum might well be of
seventeenth century origin, the notion of the jus pub licum or the
public trust, was equally well recognized and formed an integral
part of the English common law of foreshore rights.
33. Thisjus publicum is apparently a vestige of Roman law of the foreshore. See The
Public Trust in Tidal Areas, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763-64 (1970).
34. HALE, DE JURE MAreS, Ch. 6, in S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FoRESHORE (1888).
35. 5 M. BACON, A NEW ABRmGMENT OF THE LAW 498 (6th ed. 1807).
36. Id. at 494.
37. Id. at 498-99.
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B. Adoption of PatentLaw by New York
The New York adoption of Hale's theories never represented
an aberration from common law but was actually a further development and refinement of that law. Indeed, the proprietary interest of the sovereign in the land underneath navigable waters and
the alienability of the jus privatum was recognized by the New
York courts as early as 1828. Interpreting a colonial patent to the
Town of Oyster Bay, the court in Rogers v. Jones~l indicated,
It cannot be doubted, that when a patent or grant conveys a
tract of land by metes and bounds, the land under water will
pass, if the land under water lies within the bounds of the grant.
Forty years later, the Court of Appeals further elaborated on the
doctrine to be applied in New York, stating:3
The right of property in the soil or bed of a navigable river or
arm of the sea, and the right to use the waters for purposes of
navigation are entirely separate and distinct. The first of these
rights is by the common law vested prima facie in the sovereign
power; that is, in England, in the king, here, in the people; but
may be alienated by king or people so as to become vested in
an individual or corporation.
In Trustees of Brookhaven v. Strong,40 the Court of Appeals,
in upholding the municipality's exclusive right to an oyster fishery, passed on the question of title in underwater lands. While
mentioning that determination of the rights of fishing in navigable waters and the question of title to the soil of the bed involves
"the consideration of confused and antiquated customs, obsolete
terms and distinctions and conflicting opinions," 4' the court held
squarely in favor of the validity of the colonial grants. The court
found ". . . that by the common law the King had the right to
grant the soil under water and with it the exclusive right of shellfishery .... "42 This holding was followed in subsequent deci38. 1 Wend. 237, 255 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Utica 1828).
39. People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287, 292 (1863).
40. 60 N.Y. 56 (1875).
41. Id. at 66.
42. The court appears to have put to rest another point decided in Rogers; that the
Magna Charta did not proscribe the granting of the colonial charters. The Brookhaven
court upheld the determination in Rogers that the Magna Charta prevented the King from
placing any waterway "in defense" or off-limits for his own recreation. Apart from this,
neither court found any prohibition against the alienation by the sovereign of the jus
privatum. Cf. 3 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 409; People ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249,
257, 54 N.E. 682, 684 (1899).
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sions..3
The presence of the conveyable jus privatum coexistent with
the rights of the general public under the jus publicum appears
to have been well established by the end of the nineteenth century. The Court of Appeals itself indicated its belief in the validity of the colonial patents, stating:44
The title to the soil under navigable waters which vested in Long
Island towns under the colonial patents was, undoubtedly, subject to the public right of navigation. . . .But whatever limitations may have been imposed upon the title of the town. . .it
is no longer an open question that the colonial patents to the
Long Island towns vested in the towns legal title to the soil
under the waters of the bays and harbors within the bounds of
the patents.4 5
Several New York cases have even dealt with the power of
alienation by the very municipalities taking title under the colonial patents." Judge Pound, speaking for the Court of Appeals in
a 1932 decision4" involving a municipality's right to lease certain
underwater parcels held under colonial patent, noted that "[tihe
town of Oyster Bay holds common lands under water in private,
as distinguished from public, ownership which it may convey or
lease . . . subject to the public right of navigation."
In fact, the basic right of alienation by the Crown, though
subject to the jus publicum, has not been questioned by the New
York courts since the 1828 holding in Rogers. In a 1967 case involving a suit to enjoin the Town of North Hempstead from alienating certain lands under colonial grant, Justice Meyer observed
that "the town clearly has the right to convey land under water
to the adjacent upland owner,"48 though noting that such a con43. Robins v. Ackerly, 91 N.Y. 98 (1883); Hand v. Newton, 92 N.Y. 89 (1883).
44. Roe v. Strong, 107 N.Y. 350, 14 N.E. 294 (1887).
45. Id. at 358, 14 N.E. at 296. In People ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 265,
54 N.E. 682, 687 (1899), the court in construing a colonial grant upheld the notion of the
alienable jus privatum in the sovereign stating:
The result of our investigation is that we conclude that the crown had authority
to grant not only the land and the lands under the water, but the waters as well
at this point, and that the title and the sovereignty over such water and the
lands thereunder was by the [colonial] charters vested in and conferred upon
. . . the town of Southampton. [Emphasis added].
46. New York v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 113 N.E. 521 (1916); Coxe v.
New York, 144 N.Y. 396, 39 N.E. 400 (1895); Dolphin Lane Associates Ltd. v. Town of
Southampton, 72 Misc.2d 868, 339 N.Y.S. 2d 966 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1971).
47. Matter of Oystermen's Dock Co. v. Downing, 258 N.Y. 156, 179 N.E. 369 (1932).
48. Riveria Association, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 52 Misc. 2d 575, 580, 276
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veyance of the jus privatum could not be injurious to the public
good.
A review of New York decisional law thus indicates that
Hale's bifurcated theory of the interests in underwater lands continues to be the law in this state. However, while the jus privatum
is recognized, it may yet be inquired whether the proprietary
interest once conveyed by the Crown might not also be revoked
by the sovereign, now the State of New York. If the jus privatum
so conveyed by the colonial patents might be revoked, with fee
title reverting to the State of New York, the right exercised by
patented municipalities to exclude the public pursuant to fee
ownership would be extinguished.
The colonial patents have, however, always been considered
irrevocable as evidenced by the treatment of the royal grants by
the legislatures of the Colony and the State of New York, by state
and federal constitutions and by decisional law. Subsequent to
the granting of the charters to the Long Island towns, the colonial
assembly ratified and confirmed the titles so conveyed. The Court
of Appeals has observed that on
May 6th, 1691, the colonial legislature passed an act entitled
"An Act for the Setling, Quieting and Confirming unto the Cities, Towns, Mannors and freeholders within this Province, their
Several Grants, Pattents and Rights Respectively" . . . which
act provided inter alia "That all the Charters, Pattents, Grants,
made, given and granted. . .authorized by their late and present Majtys the Kings of England. . . are and shall forever be
deemed, esteemed and reputed good and effectual, Charters,
Pattents and grants Authentik in the Law against their Majesties their heiers and Successorsfor ever." Colonial Laws of New
York, Vol. 1, PP 224, 225. [Emphasis added]49
The authority of the colonial legislature to confer such a
confirmation appears never to have been seriously in doubt, " the
power of that body having been recognized for all local purposes
as representing the power of the King in Parliament." This confirmation was recognized by the first New York Constitution in
1777, which provided that: 52
N.Y.S.2d 249, 254 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967).
49. People ex rel. Howell v. Jessup, 160 N.Y. 249, 265-66, 54 N.E. 682, 687-88 (1899).
50. People v. Miller, 235 App. Div. 226, 257 N.Y.S. 300 (2d Dept. 1932).
51. Trustees of Brookhaven v. Strong, 60 N.Y. 56, 70 (1875).
52. N.Y. CONST. § XXXV (1777).
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[S]uch parts of the common law of England. . .and of the acts
of the legislature of the colony of New York as together did form
the law of the said colony on the 19th day of April, . . . one
thousand seven hundred and seventy-five. . .shall be and continue the law of this state ...
By its first Constitution, then, New York adopted not only
the common law of England but also the enactments of its own
colonial legislature. It would follow then, that even if the doctrine
of the alienable jus privatum were repudiated in England, which
study shows it was not, the adoption of the 1691 act by the State
Constitution would make the validity of the conveyances the law
of New York by constitutional command.
Hence, while it is certain that the colonial patents were
granted by the antecedent governments of Great Britain and the
Netherlands, the State of New York, by frequent ratification by
constitutional provision5 3 has upheld the acts of the original grantor as effectively as though legislative grant had been made. Indeed, since the first State Constitution, the New York legislature
itself has frequently conveyed underwater lands by grant. The
court in Matter of Long Sault Development v. Kennedy5 stated:
The power of the Legislature to grant land under navigable waters to private persons . . . has been exercised too long and has
been affirmed by this court too often to be open to serious question at this late day.
Since the legislature by frequent constitutional confirmation
stands in the position of the grantor and the land so conveyed
is proprietary in nature [the land] does not change character
because the patent was granted by the State rather than the
king or colonial governor.5
The act of the legislature in revoking or abrogating any such
grant at will would seem to be in violation of the rule of law
expressed by the Court of Appeals in Langdon v. Mayor:5"
When valid grants are once made, they are inviolable, and the
53. N.Y. CONST., art. VII, § 14 (1821); N.Y. Const., art. I, § 18 (1846); N.Y. CONST.,
art. I, § 14 (1962); cf. People v. Kraemer, 7 Misc.2d 373, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423 (Police Ct.
Village of Lloyd Harbor 1957).
54. 212 N.Y. 1, 8, 105 N.E. 849, 851 (1914).
55. Bevelandar v. Town of Islip, 17 Misc.2d 819, 185 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1959).
56. 93 N.Y. 129, 156 (1883).
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property granted can be resumed by the State, when needed for
public use, only upon making compensation.
The long usage and the recognition of the colonial land grants
have represented additional factors rendering the patents irrevocable. For example, it has been held that where a township has
exercised dominion under a colonial patent for a long period and
has filed a map of its boundaries, the State could not maintain
57
Similarly, in
an action to have title to such land vested in it.
58
Grace v. Town of North Hempstead, it was observed that the
town had voted its northern boundary in 1669 and, since the
confirmatory Dongan Patent, it
[had] taken control of the waters and the shores of these harbors. It has passed regulations over fishing, as well as touching
the building and maintenance of docks, which powers and authority it has continued actively to exercise to the present time.
This long usage constitutes the best evidence of the grant.59
State grantees have fared no better than their grantor in
invalidating the colonial patents. In upholding North Hempstead's claim to underwater land, the Grace court invalidated the
plaintiff's claim of title under a State grant stating that:"0
it must be held, as in Tiffany v. Oyster Bay, [209 N.Y. 1, 102
N.E. 585,1 that the State had not the title to the property which
it assumed to grant to this plaintiff.
C.

The PotentialLimiting Effect of Public Trust

It is clear then that the alienable jus privatum is recognized
and irrevocable, and that the towns hold title to the lands under
the grant subject only to the jus publicum, or public trust. The
basic notion behind the public trust doctrine is that "[t]here are
things which belong to no one, and the use of which is common
to all."'" The doctrine represents the principal weapon in the
environmental lawyer's arsenal. The theory highlights the importance of the sovereign's role as trustee over natural resources
and the duty of the trustee to recognize and uphold constitutionally protected rights of the populace to breathe clean air, drink
57. People v. Trustees, etc., of the Town of Brookhaven, 146 Misc. 473, 261 N.Y.S.
598 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1932).
58. 166 App. Div. 844, 152 N.Y.S. 122 (2d Dept. 1915).
59. Id. at 852, 152 N.Y.S. at 127-28.
60. Id.
61. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 526 (1896).
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clean water, and preserve the natural resources. It remains to be
seen to what extent the jus publicum may limit or effectively
eliminate the restrictive uses which towns holding under grant
have imposed. It would appear that the breadth of application
which the courts have attributed to the jus publicum would be a
determinative factor in establishing the validity of town ordinances restricting to local inhabitants the use of beaches under
grant. The courts of New York, however, while recognizing the
existence of a jus publicum have, to a certain extent, left unsettled the extent to which property constituting the foreshore and
underwater lands, once validly conveyed, is subject to the residuary rights of the public. 2
The public right of navigation has always been the most
significant of these residuary public rights. The Appellate Division, citing Hale, has observed that inherent in every such grant
there was an implied reservation of the public right, and so far
as it assumed to interfere with, or to make an exclusive appropriation of navigable waters, the grant was void. 3 In addition to this
jus publicum of navigation, it has been suggested that fishing
rights, apart from shellfishing which has been held to be in the
nature of a profit a prendre to lands underwater,64 might also
constitute part of the residuary rights of the general public. 5
It is notable, however, that the jus publicum rights of navigation and perhaps fishing have been narrowly construed by the
New York courts. In Smith v. Odell,6 plaintiff's claim alleged
that the public, in exercising its jus pub licum of navigation in the
Great South Bay was entitled to shoot waterfowl in the area,
notwithstanding a colonial patent to the lands under water expressly and exclusively conferring such privilege upon the patentees. The Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff's contention,
holding that the paramount right of navigation applied only to
62. See, e.g., Roe v. Strong, 107 N.Y. 350, 14 N.E. 294 (1877); Trustees of Town of

Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N.Y. 74, 80 N.E. 665, (1907); Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 287, 91 N.E. 896 (1910).

63. Trustees of Brookhaven v. Smith, 98 App. Div. 212, 216, 90 N.Y.S. 646, 649 (2d
Dept. 1904), rev'd on other grounds, 188 N.Y. 74, 80 N.E. 665 (1907).

64. Cf. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 198 N.Y. 287, 91 N.E. 896,
(1910); People v. Miller, 235 App. Div. 226, 232, 257 N.Y.S. 300, 305-6 (2d Dept. 1932).
65. Where two such rights or interests exist with respect to the same portion
of the earth's surface, each must be exercised and enjoyed in a reasonable way.
Each right or interest in such case is always subject to the qualification that it
cannot be exercised or enjoyed in such a way as to destroy the other.
Hedges v. Westshore Railroad Co., 150 N.Y. 150, 157, 44 N.E. 691, 693 (1896).
66. 234 N.Y. 267, 137 N.E. 325 (1922).
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those activities related to the use of the waters as a public highway. Accordingly, the court observed that the "Uus publicum
of]. . . easement of passage does not involve a surrender of other
privileges which are capable of enjoyment without interference
with the navigator. '6 7 Similarly, the public right of navigation
has been construed to permit the offshore anchorage of vessels,
but not the right to enter upon the foreshore when the jus
privatum, or private property element, was held by a town under
a colonial grant. " In all probability, the courts will continue to
hold the jus publicum of navigation to its stated purpose and not
permit expansion to other water related activities, at least as far
as municipalities under grant are concerned.
The rights of the general public in jus publicum activities
other than navigation have similarly been narrowly construed. An
early English decision held that the jus publicum of access to
navigable waters did not include passage over the foreshore for
the purposes of bathing.6 9 This holding has been examined and
modified by the 1972 decision in Tucci v. Salzhauer.7° There the
New York court found that the right of the public under jus
publicum to use the foreshore when the tide is out conferred only
the right to pass and repass as a means of access to the water and
did not include the right to lie on the beach. The notion that the
public might have access at low tide, over the foreshore for fishing
or bathing had been implied in dictum in the case of Arnold's Inn
Inc. v. Morgan.7 1 Access, per se, along the foreshore thus appears
to be recognized for certain purposes, but the extent of that access
is viewed restrictively by New York courts. Indeed, prior to Tucci
it was held that foreshore access did not include the right to drive
72 nor did it
a stake in the sand for a bather to erect a sun shelter
73 or even seaweed.7 4
include gathering of sand worms
Not only has access been viewed restrictively, but it is worth
nothing that the courts, in interpreting these aspects of the jus
publicum have dealt exclusively with access upon and across the
67. Id. at 272, 137 N.E. at 327.
68. People v. Kraemer, 7 Misc.2d 373, 164 N.Y.S. 423 (Police Ct. Village of Lloyd
Harbor 1957).
69. Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B. 1821).
70. 69 Misc.2d 226, 329 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
71. 63 Misc.2d 279, 310 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County) modified, 35 App.
Div.2d 987, 317 N.Y.S.2d 989 (2d Dept. 1970).
72. Johnson v. May, 189 App. Div. 196, 178 N.Y.S. 742 (2d Dept. 1919).
73. People v. Brennan, 142 Misc. 225, 355 N.Y.S. 331 (Nassau County Ct. 1931).
74. Parsons v. Miller, 15 Wend. 561 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. Utica 1836).
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foreshore when the tide is out. The jus pub licum has never been
imposed. upon any riparian owner75 of an upland beach area to
afford the general public access to the foreshore area. This basic
protection of riparian ownership would seem equally applicable
to the patented municipality holding upland beaches under a
grant. Indeed, access over upland beach area involves different
considerations than access over the foreshore, the former being
based on riparian rights of ownership. The distinction between
jus publicum and riparian rights of upland owners is illustrated
by a recent decision 71 wherein the right of a riparian owner to
access to navigable waters was held not to be subject to interference by the municipal holder of underwater title. The decision is
significant because it demonstrates that such access was based in
the upland owner's riparian rights and not in any way connected
with an easement, 77 public or private. The court's distinction between an easement and a riparian right has been recognized in
the past78 and has significance regarding the question of opening
town beaches under grant to non-residents. First, expansion of
riparian rights should have no effect on the notion of the jus
publicum, a public easement having no relation to riparian ownership. Secondly, expansion of riparian rights cannot defeat the
right of the towns to maintain beach facilities for their own citizens since, in virtually every instance, the townships hold title in
fee to the upland beach as riparian owners in their own right.
An overview of New York law indicates that the jus privatum
is subject not only to the legal rights of riparian owners but also
to the jus publicum of the general public in the foreshore area
which has been narrowly construed by the courts as necessarily
related to navigation or limited to restricted access for restricted
purposes.79
75. The term "riparian" has been defined as "[blelonging or relating to the bank of
a river; of or on the bank." (Black's Law Dictionary 4th ed. rev. 1968). The term is

extensively used to describe areas relating to the shore or other tidal waters. While the
proper word in this connection is "littoral", for the purposes of this discussion, the term
"riparian" will apply to upland owners in tidal areas. See Allen v. Potter, 64 Misc.2d 938,
939-40, 316 N.Y.S.2d 790, 793 (Sup. Ct. Yates County 1970).
76. Town of Hempstead v. Oceanside Small Craft Marina, Inc., 64 Misc.2d 4, 311
N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 38 App. Div. 2d
263, 328 N.Y.S.2d 894 (2d'Dept. 1972).
77. Id. at 6, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
78. Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 160 N.Y. 357, 59 N.E. 787 (1899).
79. The narrow construction of the jus publicum in New York was not disturbed by
the Gewirtz decision, the court there choosing to omit the concept entirely from its holding, basing its decision on the particular facts in that case and relying on the notion of
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D. The Mini Public Trust
Should access and enjoyment of town beaches and underwater lands be subject to a far wider interpretation? Should the jus
publicum over state beaches be expanded to open all town
beaches under grant to non-residents? Should the colonial grants,
though valid before the courts and the State Legislature and
under the common law since their inception to the present, be
condemned to nullification by the notion of the public trust?
The answers to these questions may be neither simple nor
obvious. An expansion of the application of the public trust doctrine would, not automatically open all beaches but might, on the
contrary, add strength to the power of the patented towns to keep
the beaches closed. Since patented lands were conveyed to townships in fee, these municipalities holding colonial grants stand
very much in the same position as the State vis-A-vis lands affected with a public interest. Indeed, the granting of the colonial
patents could be considered as the creation of several "mini"
public trusts where the towns receiving the patents became the
guardians and trustees of the land for the benefit of the local
residents.
First, the colonial charters to Long Island towns must be
distinguished from similar grants to private individuals. Unlike
individual recipients of private grants, towns have held title to
lands under water as corporate bodies for the benefit of all its
citizens. It was early held that the grants conveying to certain
named individuals as trustees for the people of the township created a corporate body capable of holding title to lands and providing by-laws for its protection." The townships took, not as
individuals, but as political communities, the municipality holding the common lands and natural resources as "mini" public
trust. In this regard the Court of Appeals has noted, "The grant
under these patents was in trust for the use of the inhabitants of
the town.""'
Later, the court again observed this unique relation of the
grant vis-a-vis the citizens of the township stating that the town
took and held the thing granted in its corporate political capacity, and as the representative of the crown, or of the colonial
the irrevocable public dedication, a principal wholly inapplicable where the beach facilities have always been restricted to residents.
80. Town of North Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. 100 (N.Y. Ct. Errors 1828).
81. Roe v. Strong, 107 N.Y. 350, 358, 14 N.E. 294, 296 (1887).
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government, to be administered for the public good. . .Upon
the organization of the state government, it continued to hold
the soil of the bay in that capacity and, representatively,
for the
2
benefit of the members of the community.
It is apparent, then, that the municipalities under grant took

as more than individual owners. They took as political bodies and
representatives of the State. Indeed, many of the grants were at
once conveyances and town corporate charters.83
The characterization of the patents as the foundations of a
"mini" public trust as opposed to a conveyance to an individual
for private profit is underscored by the fact that the colonial
grants not only conveyed fee title, but simultaneously created the
political subdivision designated as "towns." Hence, the idea of
restriction of access to lands under which the public may be excluded would appear to be as broad as the original limits of ownership. Thus, what the State of New York came to as political
successor to the British Colony of New York could be restricted
on a statewide basis. Therefore, patented towns, as the grantees
of the sovereign, might restrict their facilities to town residents
much the same way as the State, holding beachlands in trust for
its own citizens, may restrict the foreshore area to State residents.
The peculiar nature of the colonial grants as instruments of
government and not of private profit was further evidenced by the
United States Supreme Court which noted that the public domain granted by the patents was "to be a trust for the common
use of the new community about to be established." 4 The colonial charters were instruments "upon which were to be founded
the institutions of a great political community.""5
The distinction between private grantees and municipal
grantees holding as trustees for their citizens has been evidenced
by the judicial treatment of the two varieties of colonial patents.
Grants to private persons have usually been narrowly construed"
in favor of the sovereign. Indeed, at least one case has gone as far
as to void as contrary to public policy a patent by Governor
82. Trustees of Town of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N.Y. 74, 78, 80 N.E. 665, 666.67
(1907).
83. E. B. O'CALLAGHAN, LAWS AND ORDINANCES OF NEW NErHERLAND, 42-46 (1868).
84. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 366, 410 (1842).
85. Id. at 411.
86. In re Schurz (Harding) Ave., 2 N.Y.2d 859, 140 N.E. 2d 915, 161 N.Y.S.2d 124
(1957); DeLancy v. Piepgras, 138 N.Y. 26, 38, 33 N.E. 822, 824 (1893); State v. Phillips,
305 A.2d 644 (Del. Ch. 1973).
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Dongan attempting to convey eleven miles of foreshore to a private owner.8 7 The court indicated that the conveyance, not invalid per se, could not be upheld because it was made in derogation of public rights and served no over-all public service. Citing
the United States Supreme Court in Martin v. Waddell,1 the
court noted: "Grants to towns or other bodies endowed with local
8' 9
sovereignty form an exception to the rule.
This distinction was drawn again in People v. Foote" where
it was stated:9 '
A patent from a sovereign to a subject is to be construed more
strictly in favor of the Crown than a patent by a sovereign to a
town, which is to be construed liberally to effect its object, since
it concerns the conferring of governmentalpowers as well as title
to land. (emphasis added)
If the patents are viewed as instruments of political sovereignty to be liberally construed in order to facilitate the duties of
the town as trustee of the lands so conveyed for its citizens, what
is the effect of thejus publicum on town beach facilities? Already
narrowly construed by the New York courts from earliest case
law92 to the 1972 decision in Tucci v. Salzhauer,93 the jus publicum should remain subject to a narrow interpretation, especially
with regard to municipal colonial patents which necessarily need
liberal interpretation to enable townships to carry out their governmental functions.
If the public trust doctrine is not in itself sufficient to diminish significantly the validity of the patents, what alternative
weapons do the open-beach advocates have? A substantial proportion of Long Island beaches is covered by one patent or another. The patents thus create a formidable obstacle not merely
in terms of strength, as has been shown, but also in terms of their
87. Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton Street Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 5 N.E.2d 824
(1936).
88. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 366 (1842).
89. Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton Street Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 296, 5 N.E.
2d 824, 825 (1936).
90. 242 App. Div. 162, 273 N.Y.S. 567 (2d Dept. 1934); cf. Starke-Belknap v. New
York Cent. R.R., 197 App. Div. 249, 188 N.Y.S. 820 (2d Dept. 1921).
91. 242 App. Div. at 168, 273 N.Y.S. at 574.
92. Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. 237 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Utica 1828); cf. Dolphin Lane
Associates Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, 72 Misc: 2d 868, 339 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1971).
93. 69 Misc.2d 226, 329 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), modified 40 App.
Div. 2d 712, 336 N.Y.S. 2d 721 (2d Dept. 1972).
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widespread application. If, because of their historical validity,
they cannot be attacked frontally, what theories are available to
minimize their strength or to avoid them entirely?
II.

ALTERNATIVE COMMON LAW THEORIES

While colonial grants are not voidable on their face by the
jus publicum or public trust doctrine, other legal theories have of
late been advanced in an attempt to open patented beaches
where applicable. The patents, being viable instruments of local
government of proprietary ownership, may be susceptible to attack through various common law theories which could open patented beaches to the general public where the requisite facts present themselves.
Some of the major theories advanced have been those of
public easement, by either prescription or necessity, long usage
or custom, and implied public dedication. These theories are limited in their approach; nevertheless, they may prove useful as a
reasonable, if partial move toward opening municipal beaches
which have been kept closed by the continuing strength of the
colonial patents. These theories of limited public access to private beaches have been the source of considerable confusion in
the courts which have been interpreting their effect; opinions
often discuss an "easement by prescription" and "customary
rights in the nature of an easement" in the same breath. It is to
be observed, however, that these various theories are quite distinct, often requiring the satisfaction of different criteria before
an attack to open a beach can be successful.
A.

Public Easement By Necessity

In New York, the elements of an easement by necessity or
implication have been held to be the following: 1) Estates presently resting in the hands of different owners must have been
formerly held in unitary ownership; 2) While so formerly held, a
use must have been created by the unitary owner in or across from
what would later constitute the servient estate; 3) Such an encumbrance must be physically apparent to the taker of the servient estate and must be necessary to the reasonable enjoyment
of the dominant parcel.94 An open-beach proponent may encounter considerable difficulty in attempting to use this public ease94. Cassano v. Merriwold Club Inc., 24 App. Div.2d 819, 263 N.Y.S.2d 792, (3rd Dept.
1965), aff'd 19 N.Y.2d 640, 225 N.E.2d 208, 278 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1967); Crawford v. Lesca,
207 Misc. 93, 136 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1955).
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ment theory. While there may have been initial Dutch or English
unitary ownership of the now separate estates, the surrounding
circumstances at the time of the conveyance may not evidence
any intention of that owner to create an easement.
On the contrary, an historic survey of the patents indicates
that a motivating force behind these conveyances was an intention to exclude nonresidents rather than to give them access to
the water, and, by so doing, better to protect jealously guarded
shellfishing and water rights.95 Indeed, any necessity for access by
the grantor's successor or the general public has arisen some three
hundred years after the conveyance, a fact which defeats meeting
this criterion for an easement by necessity. Therefore, to permit
such an encumbrance at this late date would not only contradict
the explicit language of the grants, but ascribe to the parties an
intent they clearly never had. Similar problems arise with the
second criterion for such an easement which requires that the
unitary owner create a use by continual exercise over the servient
parcel. The residents of the patented townships constituted the
first settlers on Long Island; that the Dutch owner could have
created a use prior to the granting of the colonial patents is therefore historically unsound.
The last requirements for an easement by necessity are that
the encumbrance be apparent and, of course, necessary. As shown
above, it is questionable whether such an encumbrance was ever
apparent to the grantees of the patents. It would further appear
that nonresidents in those distant times had ample access to
waters apart from those found across the patented lands and thus
an easement was not even necessary. Even if a court were to
measure necessity by current standards, that is, in the light of the
clamor for full public access to recreational facilities, several additional obstacles to opening beaches by means of this easement
by necessity theory would still present themselves.
For instance, access must be necessary, not merely convenient or even highly desirable;9 7 encumbrances have been denied
where circumstances show other means of access.9" In one case,
95. Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. 237 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Utica 1828).
96. Tubb v. Rolling Ridge, Inc., 28 Misc.2d 532, 214 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1961).
97. Smith v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 235 App. Div. 262, 257 N.Y.S. 313 (4th Dept.
1932); Snyder v. Monroe County, 2 Misc. 2d 946, 153 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County) aff'd 6 App. Div.2d 859, 175 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (4th Dept. 1956); Tucci v. Giarrusso,
124 N.Y.S.2d 17 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1953).
98. Carman v. Hewitt, 105 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1951), modified
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upland owners were held to have an easement by necessity to
reach a nonnavigable pond, that is, one for which there existed
no other means of access.2 9 However, where navigable waters have
existed, the courts have often held that there is sufficient access
and have denied easements across a riparian owner's lands. This
result is prevalent in the so-called "deep water" cases.,"
The New York element of necessity, then, has usually been
construed quite strictly,'"' and yet in considering what actually
constitutes "necessity," variable factors of availability, popularity, expense and convenience should not be discounted in the
judicial balancing process. The more relaxed definitions of necessity employed by other jurisdictions might provide useful arguments to be made to a New York court by an open-beach proponent. Several Maine decisions have recognized an easement
despite other access to the foreshore, "where the expense to be
incurred in creating or using another is excessive."'' ° A number
of cases in other jurisdictions have gone as far as recognizing a
necessity despite the availability of some form of access to property by water, with a recent Maryland decision noting that "the
more modern view" of necessity is met "if the water route is not
available or suitable to meet the requirements of the uses to
which the property would reasonably be put."'' 3 While this view
assesses the problem more reasonably and more realistically, one
Texas decision held that the element of necessity had not been
met when the state, seeking to enforce such an encumbrance, had
the alternative means of exercising its powers of condemnation."'
In any case, even if the New York courts liberalize the element
of necessity, the other common law criteria would still have to be
280 App. Div. 866, 114 N.Y.S.2d 266 (2d Dept. 1952), afl'd 305 N.Y. 718, 112 N.E.2d 785
(1953).
99. Lochte v. Ciccarelli, 270 App. Div. 798, 60 N.Y.S.2d 126 (4th Dept. 1946).
100. Moore v. Day, 199 App. Div. 76, 191 N.Y.S. 731 (3rd Dept. 1921)., afl'd 235 N.Y.
554, 139 N.E. 732 (1923); Bauman v. Wagnet, 146 App. Div. 191, 130 N.Y.S. 1016 (4th
Dept. 1911); Staples v. Cornwall, 114 App. Div. 596, 99 N.Y.S. 1009 (4th Dept. 1906).
101. Often so strictly, in fact, that a plaintiff who claimed an easement by necessity
was denied relief when he could gain access by a reconveyance of another parcel to himself.
Sackett v. O'Brien, 43 Misc.2d 476, 251 N.Y.S. 2d 863 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County) modified
27 App. Div. 979, 278 N.Y.S.2d 788 (4th Dept. 1967), afl'd 23 N.Y.2d 883, 245 N.E.2d 814,
298 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1969).
102. Littlefield v. Hubbard, 124 Me. 299, 128 A.285 (1925); Flood v. Earle, 145 Me.
24, 71 A.2d 55 (1950).
103. Hancock v. Henderson, 236 Md. 98, 202 A.2d 599 (1964); Feoffees of Grammar
School v. Proprietors of Jeffreys' Heck Pasture, 174 Mass. 572, 55 N.E. 462 (1899).
104. State v. Black Bros., 116 Tex. 615, 297 S.W. 213 (1927).
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overcome; these hurdles, as shown, may well be insurmountable
when seeking to create a public easement of necessity across patented town beaches.
Additional problems become apparent when it is noted that
an easement by implication or necessity is one principally affording rights of ingress and egress. The usefulness of the easement
would thus apply only where the state already owns the foreshore.
On the South Shore, the colonial patents did not carry past the
5
high water mark,'W
and an easement through the upland owner's
land to the state-owned beach would be of some use. On the
North Shore, however, the patents carried with them the land
under the waters of the bays and harbors.' Thus, an easement
conferring merely rights of ingress and egress would not lead to
any usable beach area. Furthermore, if such an easement were
ever permitted it would still be subject to extinguishment when
the necessity that gave rise to it abated.' 7 This last restriction is
of particular importance when, assuming such an easement were
allowed, the state acquires new beach facilities in the near-by
area. In such a case, the beach in question should revert to its
exclusionary nature, the public having gained alternate access to
the state-owned foreshore.1'5
B.

Public Easement by Prescription

An alternative theory of public access by easement is that of
easement by prescription, more frequently characterized as one
of "use" rather than "ingress and egress." Prescriptive easements, like adverse possession, ripen into full title when held or
exercised under a claim of right, adversely, openly and notoriously for an uninterrupted statutory period. In New York the
specified period is ten years.' 9
105. The curious history of such a patent, that to the Town of Southampton, is
outlined in the recent decision in Dolphin Lane Associates Ltd. u. Town of Southampton,
72 Misc.2d 868, 339 N.Y.S. 2d 966 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1971).
106. People v. Levine, 74 Misc.2d 808, 810, 343 N.Y.S.2d 816, 818 (Dist. Ct. Nassau
County 1973).
107. Palmer v. Palmer, 150 N.Y. 139, 44 N.E. 966 (1896); Hines v. Hamburger, 14
App. Div. 577, 43 N.Y.S. 977 (2d Dept. 1897).
108. Cf. New York Carbonic Acid Gas Co. v. Gysers Natural Carbonic Acid Gas Co.,
72 App. Div. 304, 76 N.Y.S. 46 (3d Dept. 1902).
109. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW AND RuLs § 212(a) (McKinney 1972); DiLeo v. Pecksto
Holding Corp., 304 N.Y. 505, 512, 109 N.E.2d 600, 603 (1952); Jansen v. Sawling, 37 App.
Div.2d 635, 322 N.Y.S.2d 399 (3d Dept. 1971); Long Island Beach Buggy Ass'n v. Town
of Islip, 58 Misc.2d 295, 295 N.Y.S.2d 268, (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1968) aff'd 35 App.
Div.2d 739, 316 N.Y.S.2d 430 (2d Dept. 1970).
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Several difficulties are faced by litigants seeking to establish
public easements by prescription over patented beaches, the most
notable being the proof of the adverse nature of the use, if any,
by the general public. Certainly, it is not every use of another's
land which gives rise to a prescriptive easement. 10 The nature of
the use must be adverse and hostile, that is, wrongful or actionable.' As a result, where municipalities have permitted use of
their beaches either by guests of residents or nonresidents subject
to special payment, euch use by the general public is not hostile
or adverse, but permissible pursuant to a license. To allow a
prescriptive easement to run under these circumstances approaches a violation of the settled rule that an owner cannot
acquire a prescriptive easement against himself." 2 It follows then,
that wherever permission for beach use was given, express or
implied, use by nonresidents can never ripen into a prescriptive
right."

3

The opening of a patented beach under a theory of prescriptive easements may well fail even where permission for use by the
general public was never granted. It is questionable whether the
general public represents a party capable of acquiring a prescriptive right; New York cases have usually held that a use shared
with the general public is not the type of activity capable of
establishing such an encumbrance."' This may be so owing to the
fact that use by the general public may not be legally "adverse"
since the public at large is not amenable to an action in ejectment
or trespass.
Further, it is doubtful whether any easement by prescription
would be permitted to run against any parcel "affected with a
public interest."" 5 Patented beaches, while often relegated to resident use only, are held and operated by municipalities as a pub110. Battista v. Pine Island Park Ass'n, 28 App. Div.2d 714, 281 N.Y.S.2d 635 (2d
Dept. 1967).

111. Attianese v. Colonial Woods, Inc., 19 Misc.2d 513, 187 N.Y.S. 2d 531 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1959).
112. Kasper v. Moore, 54 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. Chemung County 1944).
113. Cf. Cardinale v. Deed Realty Corp., 130 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1954); White Cap Sea Foods, Inc. v. Panzer, 2 Misc.2d 421, 148 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup.
Ct. Suffolk County 1954) modified, 1 App. Div.2d 963, 150 N.Y.S.2d 322 (2d Dept. 1956);
DeForest v. Bunnie, 201 Misc. 7, 107 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. Herkimer County 1951)
aff'd., 280 App. Div. 1035, 117 N.Y.S.2d 676 (4th Dept. 1952); Jansen v. Sawling, 37 App.
Div. 2d 635, 322 N.Y.S.2d 399 (3d Dept. 1971).
114. Peck v. State, 15 App. Div.2d 443, 224 N.Y.S.2d 758 (4th Dept. 1962).
115. Cotrone v. City of New York, 38 Misc.2d 580, 237 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1962); Driggs v. Phillips, 103 N.Y. 77, 8 N.E. 514 (1886).
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lic trust, the tracts in question obviously not the sort of privately
held lands contemplated by law over which an easement by prescription may be created.
C. Customary Rights in the Nature of a Public Easement
Perhaps because of these technical difficulties encountered
with the easement approaches, the Oregon Supreme Court in
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,"' chose instead to implement the
notion of a customary right of enjoyment in beaches and the
foreshore in opening to the general public free and unimpaired
access to that state's shoreline. The decision, however, is distinguishable on its facts and may do little to introduce into New
York law the concept of a right of access by custom against townships holding 300 year old patents.
In the Oregon case, the issue was whether the state had the
power to prevent defendant landowners from enclosing the drysand area contained within the legal description of their oceanfront property. In holding that the state had the power to do so,
the court recognized a public right-of-way to the state owned
foreshore over the privately held dry-sand area. This right was
held to exist through the English doctrine of custom, defined by
Blackstone to be a use 1) so ancient "that the memory of man
runneth not to the contrary," 2) exercised without interruption,
3) the customary exercise of which is peaceful and free from dispute, 4) reasonable, 5) obligatory as against those who would
with other customs
oppose it, 6) not contravening or inconsistent
7
or laws, and 7) certain in its scope.1
Unlike the situation in the Oregon case, the foreshore under
most Long Island waters, where there are patents, belongs to the
affected towns and not the state. Even where, as on the South
Shore, patents carry only to the high water mark, the patented
towns existed at least 100 years before the dawn of the state's
political existence. Thus, the state could not have established an
116. 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671, 675-6 (1969).
117. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 76-79, (16 ed. 1925).
Bacon's Abridgment defines custom somewhat differently:
The frequent repetition of an act which at first was a) assented to by the people
of a certain place b) for their mutual conveniency and advantage, 'is called a
custom, and every such custom, being certain and reasonable in itself, and
commencing time immemorial, and always continuing without interruption, has
obtained the force of a law, and in such places shall prevail, though c) contrary
to the general laws of the kingdom. (emphasis added) 2 M. BACON, A NEW
ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAw 232 (6 ed. 1807).
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ancient customary use of access. The importance of this long and
continued use is discussed at considerable length in the New York
case of Gillies v. OrientaBeach Club."8 The plaintiffs sought to
open a private beach by alleging that, for more than 50 years, by
custom and usage, the inhabitants of Orienta Beach had used and
enjoyed the parcel of land in question for access to Long Island
Sound, for the purposes of bathing and boating. In determining
whether a customary right in the nature of an easement existed
in New York, the court observed:" 9
The complaint alleges that the easement has been in use for 50
years. Such an allegation in England would not have justified
invoking the law of custom for in its history 50 years is but a
short period and such a use would not be considered as time
immemorial.
The court adopted the view that "[c]ustom, moreover, is an
outcome of immemorial usage, and will not ordinarily result from
proof of twenty years of adverse enjoyment."'2 0
In seeking to satisfy this requirement the Oregon Court in
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay had noted, "Oregonians could satisfy that requirement by recalling that the European settlers were
not the first people to use the dry-sand area as public land."''
However, where colonial patents have existed and have been upheld for 300 years, such a basis for a customary right might appear quite strained. Further, considering the requirement that a
customary right must have been exercised continuously, as well
as for time immemorial, an interruption of some 300 years between the use by the original inhabitants and that of the general
public now, may prove fatal to the establishment of a customary
right in the nature of an easement.
In addition to confirming the difficulty of establishing an
ancient use, the Gillies court further narrowed the scope of customary rights in New York. It observed that such rights created
in a use by its continual and consistent exercise might vest in the
residents of a given locality but not in a general, unorganized
public:2
118. 159 Misc. 675, 289 N.Y.S. 733 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1935), aff'd 248
App. Div. 623, 288 N.Y.S. 136 (2d Dept. 1936).
119. Id. at 681, 289 N.Y.S. at 740.
120. Id. at 678, 289 N.Y.S. at 736.
121. 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671, 678 (1969).
122. 159 Misc. 675, 678, 289 N.Y.S. 733, 736 (Sup. Ct.. Westchester County 1935).
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There have been presented to the courts very few cases in which
title to incorporeal hereditaments has been held to rest on custom alone. In the rare instances in which it has given rise to
servitudes it has been shown to have continued for time out of
mind in favor of a practically definite class of families or persons
constituting a town, village or other community...
Thus only a limited number of people could benefit from the
finding of an easement by custom and the general public's need
for access to the beaches would barely be alleviated.
The establishment of customary rights in the nature of easements has encountered a frosty reception in the New York courts
in Pearas is perhaps best evidenced by the celebrated12 decision
3
sal v. Post where the New York Court stated:
[A] rule of law, which should admit the possibility of turning
such enjoyment into a prescriptive and absolute right on the
part of the public, would open a field of litigation, which no
community could endure. What is still worse in a moral point
of view, it would be perverting neighborhood forbearance and
good nature, to the destruction of important rights.
A remedy adequate to open the state-owned foreshore to public access in Oregon manifestly is not suitable in the peculiar
factual and legal climate of New York, particularly where beaches
are held under colonial grant. In fact, it would appear that customary rights in the nature of a public easement are as technically difficult to establish in law as the more traditional easements of necessity and prescription. Owing perhaps to the difficulty of establishing these common law rights of access, several
courts have adopted instead the relatively new concept of the
implied public dedication.
D.

The Implied Public Dedication

A discussion of an implied dedication of beachfront property
to a public purpose must properly be separated into two areas:
1) dedication of government-acquired land to the general public
through an express or implied dedication, and 2) the taking of a
recreational easement over private property through the device of
an implied dedication.
The court in Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach 124 laid down basic
guidelines to be followed in future litigation against a governmen123. 20 Wend. 111, 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
124. 69 Misc.2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
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tal owner of a beach which had once been open to the general
public, but which was later restricted to use by residents exclusively. In that case, the city of Long Beach acquired the beachfront property in the years 1935-1937. Federal funds were obtained in 1935 for use in projects to both stabilize the beach
against erosion and to enhance it as a recreational facility. Local
Law IV/36 was enacted in 1936 to give the City Council authority
to supervise and maintain the beach park.'1 It further gave the
City Council power to charge a reasonable fee for the use of the
beach park. That legislation did not, however, give the City
Council the power to delimit the class of persons who could use
the facility. Members of the general public at large used the
beach park from 1936 until the passage of Local Law IX/70 in
1970.21 That law restricted the use of the beach to residents of the
City of Long Beach and their invited guests. Plaintiffs Albert and
Paula Gewirtz were residents of Lido Beach, a community adjoining Long Beach, and plaintiff-intervenor Judith Friedlaender was
a resident of New York City.
The court indicated, first of all, that, had Long Beach desired
to create a park solely for its own residents, it could have taken
steps to insure that the instruments of conveyance, by which it
took title to the land, contained restrictions requiring that the
property be devoted to a specific public use. No such restrictions
were put on the conveyences, however. In discussing Local Law
2
IV/36 the court remarked:' 1

That Local Law 'created a public park' out of the
municipally-owned ocean beach front property and directed the
City Council to make provision by ordinance for the supervision
and maintenance of the public park and for the collection of a
reasonable charge from users of the public park to be prescribed
by the same ordinance ....
It is difficult to conceive of any method better calculated
to express the intent to dedicate its ocean beach front property
to public use as a public park than the local law which the City
enacted in 1936 and the implementing ordinance which it thereafter adopted. These actions by the city manifested unequivocally an intention to dedicate the municipally-owned property
to public use as a public park.
125. Local Law IV/36, enacted April 26, 1936, became § 98 City Charter of Long
Beach (amended 1970).
126. Local Law IX/70, enacted Nov. 4, 1970, became § 98 City Charter of Long

Beach.
127. 69 Misc.2d 763, 770, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495, 505 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
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The court further stated that not only did the City's initial
actions constitute an offer to dedicate the land to a public purpose, but its subsequent actions constituted an acceptance on
behalf of the general public of its own offer to dedicate the land
to the aforementioned use.'12
Consideration was given to the fact that acceptance may also
be found in continuous, actual public use, the court remarking
that: 121

If the element of acceptance is necessary in this case for a
completed dedication to use of the public park and its facilities
by the public at large, it is found both in what the City itself
has done in operating and maintaining its public park and also
in the use which the public at large has made of such facilities
over a period of more than thirty years.
Since it is settled in New York that once a public park has
been dedicated it cannot be alienated without express legislative
consent,'"" a municipality would be rather limited in its options
should a public dedication be found to have been made. The
court did take care to point out that, while, a locality may restrict
"self-supporting improvements,"' 3 ' such as beaches, to use by its
residents, express power to do so must be conferred upon the
locality by the Legislature.'1 2 Long Beach, of course, received no
such express grant of power.
Of all the theories discussed, given the requisite facts, an
action based on an implied public dedication probably has the
best chance for success. Perhaps, because of the inequities of
closing a beach to a segment of the population which has long
enjoyed and supported that facility, courts seem to look favorably
upon such actions. In the case of Long Beach, for 35 years nonresidents used the beach and patronized the local business establishments. Non-residents helped defray the cost of beach operations by paying higher fees than residents and also, through their
patronage of local business, aided the economy of the City. In
128. Id. at 771, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
129. Id. at 773, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
130. Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234 (1871).
131. N.Y. TowN LAW § 140 (McKinney 1965) defines "self-supporting improvements" as "[Any dock, pier, wharf, bathing beach . . .from which revenues are obtained by the imposition and collection of rates, fees, tolls or admissions."
132. N.Y. ToWN LAW § 143 (McKinney Supp. 1972): "The town board of any town
in Suffolk County and of any suburban town may. . . limit the use of such self supporting
improvement to residents of the town. ..."
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fact, when the beaches were first closed it was a group of businessmen who joined in the action for a declaratory judgment to re33
open them.
The Avon 34 court pointed out that all the35 benefits do not run
only from the beach owner to the populace:
On the other hand, the values of real estate in the community, both commercial and residential, are undoubtedly
greater than those of similar properties in inland municipalities
by reason of the proximity of the ocean and the accessibility of
the beach. And commercial enterprises located in the town are
more valuable because of the patronage of large numbers of
summer visitors.
Resort communities which restrict their beaches after having
received the benefits of years of public support are not only bad,
neighbors, but they also show a callous disregard of the needs of
the very people who helped build their communities. Certainly,
as far as Long Beach is concerned, it has little reason to complain
of the result of the Gewirtz decision. The public funds and support it received over the years more than justify the opening of
the beaches.
Many recent nationally decided cases' 36 have considered the
second problem, that of acquiring public rights in privately
owned property. Generally, the device used to secure these rights
is adverse use by the general public of the private owner's land,
giving rise to the notion that that owner had impliedly dedicated
a recreational easement over his land to the general public. Given
the state of the law in this area in New York and the generally
unfavorable conditions for such an action on Long Island, the
likelihood of a successful action of this sort seems rather remote.
Since these cases will continue to be relied on by plaintiffs, a
short discussion of them seems in order.
Basically, actions based on implied dedication are somewhat
unfair because, what they in effect do, is penalize the generous
owner who has acquiesced in use of his land by the general public.
In actuality, this sort of action causes far more harm than good..
133. Kalin v. City of Long Beach, Sup. Ct., Nassau County, 27 N.Y.2d 799, 264
N.E.2d 351, 315 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Mer. 1970).
134. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d
47 (1972).
135. Id. at 300, 294 A.2d at 49-50.
136. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal.3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970);
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
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A recent law review article 3 points out that California beach
owners, upon learning of the Gion'31 decision, where a public easement by use was found against a private beach owner, immediately took steps to halt effectively the public use of their beaches.
This is perfectly understandable behavior since the value of
prized shoreline property would be considerably lessened by an
easement in favor of the general public.
In an area like Long Island, the mere discovery of a beach
where adverse use would be possible would be a major feat. Most
beaches in private hands are held either by homeowners or beach
clubs and since in neither case are the beaches absentee owned,
the degree of control over who uses the beach is very great. It
seems a remote possibility that the general public might ever
adversely use such beaches for 10 years.
It should be noted that most courts are extremely reluctant
to enforce prescriptive easements. In a recent Florida decision' 39
the District Court of Appeals, First District, in upholding a prescriptive easement in favor of the general public, took great care
to indicate that this was an extraordinary action with limited
application:I4
Not all use of beaches or shoreline gives rise to a prescriptive easement. Neither occasional use by a large number of
bathers nor frequent or even constant use by a smaller number
of bathers gives rise to a prescriptive right in the public to use
privately owned beaches.
There are many beaches along our entire shoreline that are
resorted to by local residents and visitors alike without giving
rise to prescriptive easements. It is only where the use during
the prescribed period is so multitudinous that the facilities of
local government agencies must be put into play to regulate
traffic, keep the peace and invoke sanitary measures that it can
be said that the public has acquired a prescriptive right to use
privately owned beaches.
The terms prescription and implied dedication are often used
.interchangeably. Many courts, perhaps unhappy with the harsh
sound of the term prescription, prefer to say that the owner has
137. O'Flaherty, This Land Is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedicationand Its
Application to CaliforniaBeaches, 44 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 1094, 1095 (1971).
138. 2 Cal.3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970).
139. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271 So.2d 765 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972).
140. Id. at 770.
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impliedly dedicated the easement."' This is, no doubt, related to
the high regard American courts have traditionally had for the
property rights of individual citizens. In reply to the argument
advanced by the plaintiff in City of Daytona Beach v. TonaRama, Inc. 12 that the general public had certain rights of access
across private beaches which did not even require adverse use, the
court said:'
Were we to accept such notions, it would amount to expropriation of private property without compensation by sheer judicial fiat. Our initial decision herein was and is in no way influenced by appellee's notions that the need to preserve beaches for
public recreation in any way authorizes the taking of such
beaches from their lawful owners.
It should be apparent that actions seeking the finding of a
public dedication are neither favored by most courts nor do they
have any widespread application. This type of action is inappropriate against a restrictive municipality because of the requirement that the use be open and notorious. If the use were not the
action would fail. If the use were open and notorious, the correct
action would be one of an implied dedication, not this hybrid
adverse use-implied dedication type action. Because of its effects
and limited applicability, this action probably has no viable future.
Clearly, there are many technical and historical problems
with these common law theories, no one of which seems to be a
universally effective means of getting past the barrier of the colonial patents to open beaches. New approaches of potentially great
usefulness may come from the action of the ocean itself. Accretion
and erosion of beaches affect the status of title, and the use of
federal funds to control or modify these natural events affects the
governing power of the local towns. These relatively more recent
developments may be the source of new approaches for open
beach advocates.
A.

IV. NEW THEORIES
Changes in the Ocean Littoral

Successful application of a legal theory to open a restricted
141. For an enlightening discussion of the question of whether to term such an action
a prescription or a dedication see Comment, Access to PublicLands Across Intervening
PrivateLands, 8 LAND & WATER L. REv. 149, 163-71 (1973).
142. 271 So.2d 765 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972).
143. Id. at 769.
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beach to access by the general public often depends on the particular circumstances of the locus in quo. Indeed, much of the foregoing has indicated that the colonial patents granted to Long
Island townships have rendered many of the better known theories without meaningful force and effect. It is to be remembered,
however, that not all colonial patents contained the same areas
within their descriptions and the extent of these conveyances was,
at times, severely limited. The most important variation among
the colonial grants is between the type of conveyance which prevailed on the South Shore of Long Island as opposed to that on
the North Shore. South Shore grants, which often included the
barrier beaches, carried title only to the highwater mark of the
Atlantic Ocean, while North Shore conveyances usually included
entire bays and inlets and all the lands thereunder. In other
words, patents on the South Shore usually left title to the fore44
shore in the state.
Recently, great concern has been generated regarding natural forces which are working to effect significant changes upon the
ocean shoreline along the barrier beaches on the southerly side of
Long Island. The action of wind and waves on the barrier
beaches, coupled with the acts of riparian owners in the erection
of groins and jetties to protect against erosion may, by artificially
inducing accretion or reliction, 4 1 have the effect of drastically
modifying legal claim to title in these ocean beaches. This modification can result regardless of whether the riparian owners are
private individuals, or a municipality holding a barrier beach in
fee pursuant to a colonial grant. 4
144. City of New York v. Feltman, 230 App. Div. 299, 243 N.Y.S. 625 (2d Dept.
1930), modified sub nom. In re Public Beach in City of New York, 256 N.Y. 156, 176 N.E.
5 (1931); Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton Street Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 5 N.E.2d
292 (1936); Dolphin Land Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Southampton, 72 Misc. 2d 868, 882,
339 N.Y.S.2d 966, 981 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1971).
145. J. CINGLE, JR. DEVELOPMENTS IN SEDIMENTOLOGY, THE MOVEMENT OF BEACH SAND

(1966); E. BIRD, 4 AN INTRODUCTION To SYsTEmMATc GEOMORPHY, COASTS (1969); W. WILLIAMS, COASTAL CHANGES (1960).
146. The rights of riparian or littoral owners regarding additional land that has accreted to their shoreline, or the effect of erosion on legal title were recognized early in
English law. Blackstone observed that:
And as to the lands gained from the sea, either by alluvion, by the washing up
of sand and earth, so as in time to make terrafirma; or by dereliction, as when
the sea shrinks back below the usual watermark; in these cases the law is held
to be, that if this gain be by little and little, by small and imperceptible degrees,
it shall go to the owner of the land adjoining. For de minimis non curat lex: and,
besides, these owners being often losers by the breaking in of the sea, or at
charges to keep it out, this possible gain is therefore a reciprocal consideration
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The leading case settling the rights of riparian or littoral
ownership in this respect is Matter of City of Buffalo'47 where it
was held that gradual encroachment by erosion would result in a
loss of title in eroded shoreline property. Therefore, it follows that
title to beachfront may be extinguished by acts of erosion or
submergence, the former consisting of a gradual eating away of
the soil by the operation of current or tide, the latter representing
the disappearance of lands under water and the formation of a
navigable body over it.4 1 Where the shoreline has diminished
along the barrier beaches from ocean currents, riparian title has
been lost with the underwater land reverting to the state as owner
of the land under the ocean. This rule of common law has been
held to operate with equal force against all riparian owners,
whether private or municipal, since governmental bodies have
been held equally affected "by the rules of avulsion, erosion and
accretion."' 49
The operation of this natural force, therefore, could result in
the state gaining title to significant amounts of beach land and
thereby greatly increase at least the amount of foreshore available
to all state residents.
Of course, riparian owners may not always be subject to the
natural effects of erosion and may often enjoy increased beachfront as a result of accretion. However, additional dry-sand area
by accretion may have several legal implications depending on
how it came to rest on that owner's parcel.
The South Shore towns have been erecting systems of groins
and jetties in an attempt to halt the erosion of their beaches and
with the resultant increase in the state's beach land. However,
since the accretions which may result have been caused by artificial means, title to the area gained will not automatically go to
the riparian owner, in this instance the towns. Where the accumulation of land has been too rapid to be classified as an accretion, the riparian owners almost certainly would not get title. The
for such possible charge or loss. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 261-62 (7th ed.
1775).
147. 206 N.Y. 319, 99 N.E. 850 (1912).
148. Michelsin v. Leskowicz, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 831, 838 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1945),
affrd, 270 App. Div. 1042, 63 N.Y.S.2d 191 (2d Dept. 1946); Mulry v. Norton, 100 N.Y.
424, 3 N.E. 581 (1885).
149. Lawkins v. City of New York, 272 App. Div. 920, 921, 71 N.Y.S.2d 112 (2d Dept.
1947), aff'd., 297 N.Y. 747, 77 N.E. 2d 516 (1948); Board of Educ. of Union Free School
District No. 11 v. Nyquist, 28 App. Div. 2d 936, 281 N.Y.S.2d 486 (3d Dept. 1967).
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applicable rule in this situation states that property boundaries
do not change where the physical alteration was due to a sudden,
perceptible change in the littoral. 50
Often, however, those accumulations are gradual rather than
sudden and the riparian owner's claim may be stronger in that
case. It is the general rule that accretion due to some artificial
condition created by a third party will not preclude a riparian
owner from asserting title over the new land so formed, despite
the fact that such an accumulation was brought about by artificial means."' Nevertheless, this rule is not so generous when the
accumulations so formed resulted from the intentional acts of the
riparian owner who benefited. The New York Court of Appeals
52
noted in an early decision:
If by some artificial structure or impediment in the stream, the
current should be made to impinge more strongly against one
bank, causing it imperceptibly to wear away and causing a corresponding accretion on the opposite bank,. . J am not prepared to say that the riparian owner (so injured) would not be
entitled to the alluvion thus formed, especially against the party
who caused it.
Artificial accumulations may thus render an improving riparian owner liable to other owners, one of whom might be the
state holding an adjoining beach area. The state may be able to
acquire title to the accumulated land under the theory of the
Halsey case, if its own adjoining land has been diminished by
action of the water around the groins and jetties. The state might
also acquire rights in such an artificially formed beach by asserting that riparian accumulations pursuant to jetties and groins
constitute an addition of land by wholly artificial means and not
such a natural accrual of sand as to carry title. Since a mere fill
of underwater land, unless held adversely for the period of prescription, cannot work a change in title, the beach areas so
150. Matter of City of Buffalo, 206 N.Y. 319, 99 N.E. 850 (1912); Town of Hempstead
v. Lawrence, 147 App. Div. 624, 626, 132 N.Y.S. 615, 617 (2d Dept. 1911); Town of
Hempstead v. Little, 22 N.Y.2d 432, 239 N.E.2d 722, 293 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1968).
151. Halsey v. McCormick, 18 N.Y. 147 (1858); In re Neptune Avenue, 238 App. Div.
839, 262 N.Y.S. 679 (2d Dept. 1933); In re Hutchinson River Parkway Extension, 14
N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1939), modified, 260 App. Div. 999, 24 N.Y.S.2d
991 (1st Dept. 1940), aff'd., 285 N.Y. 587, 33 N.E.2d 252 (1941); Long Island Lighting Co.
v. People, 22 Misc.2d 979, 196 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960).
152. Halsey v. McCormick, 18 N.Y. 147, 150 (1858).
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formed may be held to be, not in the former riparian owner, but
in the state, the owner of the land which was formerly underwater.' '3 Thus, through both accretion and erosion, the state may
gain title or at least access to additional beach areas no longer
under the restrictions of the patented towns and available for use
by all the residents of the state.
B.

Effect of State and FederalFunds

The action of these natural forces which may serve to increase available beach land for the state also looms in the background of a different approach in the attempt to open the
beaches: the use of federal funds for erosion and pollution control.
When considering the effect of the taking of federal and state
funds by a locality to use for the improvement of beaches held in
fee and restricted to the sole use of its residents, one must look
not only to what funds were accepted in the past, but also to the
monies which will be needed in the future to finance costly erosion control projects.
The question of whether the taking of federal funds will, in
and of itself, be sufficient to open a restricted beach is unresolved
at this time. Certainly, the equities of this situation require that
the restricting locality should not be permitted to accept federal
monies while excluding those whose taxes are the source of those
monies. Yet if equity was the rule, no one would ever be denied
the free use of our beaches.
Recently, courts have considered the question of discrimina-"
tion against non-residents. The Supreme Court has stated that
the brevity of the term of one's residency within a state is not a
valid form of discrimination in the administration of state welfare
funds.'-' There are statements from lower federal courts to the
effect that, while residents and non-residents may be treated differently if there are valid reasons for doing so,' 5 the basis of
discrimination must be rational and not arbitrary.' The municipal beach owner who has accepted federal funds will find it difficult to show the rationality and reasonableness of its actions
153.
County),
154.
155.
aff'd 405
156.

Arnold's Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 63 Misc.2d 279, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
modified 35 App. Div. 2d 987, 317 N.Y.S. 2d 989 (2d Dept. 1970).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
American Commuters Ass'n, Inc. v. Levitt, 279 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1969).
Campbell v. Board of Educ., 310 F. Supp. 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
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where it has used public funds to finance what is in reality a
private beach club.
When a municipality which holds beaches endangered by
erosion, agrees to accept the assistance of the Army Corps of
Engineers, the implications of that act seem to be that the
beaches will have to be opened to the general public. Prompted
by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,57 the Department
of Defense issued regulations'5 s which affected the power of a
locality to restrict the use of a beach which was the recipient of
benelts from projects initiated by the Corps of Engineers. These
regulations state that no person in the United States shall, on the
grounds of race, color, or national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or otherwise be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity for which the applicant received the assistance of the Corps of Engineers. Indeed,
the applicant must agree to abide by these provisions before any
work commences. While the agreement does not specifically include the category of residency, the viewpoint of persons questioned at the New York office of the Corps of Engineers'59 was that
a recipient of aid for beach stabilization would be precluded from
denying non-residents the use of its beach. '
Even in cases where federal funds are obtained without stipulating that the object of the funding will not be restricted, the
great weight of opinion would seem to buttress the position that
the federally funded facility may not be restricted. Nassau
County strictly follows a policy that the use of county parks and
recreational facilities are to be restricted to use by county residents. The County Executive has stated, however, that where
federal funds are used to obtain or build a facility, it shall be open
to all. Indeed, the planned Mitchel Field recreational complex
will, because of the expected federal funding, be open to the
general public.
The taking of federal funds for beach improvement may also
be viewed as raising a presumption that the recipient of those
funds intended to dedicate the use of the beach to the general
public.
The beaches of the City of Long Beach were opened to the
157.
158.
Dec. 25,
159.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1972).
32 C.F.R. Part 300 (1970), issued as Department of Defense Directive 5500.11,
1964.
Interview with personnel of the Corps of Engineers, New York City, March 7,
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general public because the Gewirtz court found that they had
been dedicated to the public use. Included in a summary of what
the court considered to be the "essential allegations set forth in
the complaint of the plaintiffs"'' 0 was the acceptance of federal
funds by the City. The court noted:'
Simultaneously with the acquisition of such beach area the
City applied for Federal funding for beach and ocean front improvements including demolition of the old and the erection of
a new boardwalk, construction of stone jetties and supplementing the beach front with sand fill. In 1935 the Federal Government, through one of its agencies, issued a commitment for a
grant and loan subject to its rules and regulations and that on
October 19, 1935 the Common Council of the City adopted a
resolution accepting the offer of the Federal Government. Preliminary to such funding the United States Engineers Office
granted permission to the city for the proposed beach and ocean
front improvements upon condition that the City would not
attempt to forbid the full and free use by the public of all naviagable waters at or adjacent to the work or structure.
It is interesting to note that, while the City promised that it
would not interfere with the "full and free use by the public of
all navigable waters at or adjacent to the work or structures,"'' 2
the thrust of the decision was toward an implied dedication
rather than toward making the City merely fulfill its commitment. Yet in focusing on the acceptance of the funds rather than
on the agreement not to interfere with public use, the court's
decision was broader and holds far greater implications for the
future. It appears that the court felt that the taking of funds
raised the presumption that the City intended to dedicate its
beaches:

3

[T]he evidence shows that even before acquisition of the property was fully complete, the City had taken steps to obtain
Federal funds to finance measures designed to lessen the erosion
of the beach and to reconstruct the boardwalk. The action thus
taken when combined with what was done by the city within a
short time after title to the area was acquired, i.e., the creation
of a public park out of the land so acquired, strongly suggests
160. Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc.2d 763, 767, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495, 502 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1972).
161. Id. at 767, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 774, 775, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
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that in reality the property was acquired with the purpose in
mind of devoting it to a special public use.
In this case, the funds were received shortly after title was
acquired. However, should the presumption be limited to operation only where such facts exist? The language and the importance placed by the court on the acceptance of federal funds suggests otherwise. A broad application of the presumption would
have dramatic impact with regard to future actions. Certainly the
public monies provided to fund a Corps of Engineers project or
to construct a boardwalk should lend credence to the presumption that a municipality has intended to dedicate its beaches.
Such an argument is not difficult to follow where the funds have
been directly applied to beach improvement. What, however,
would be the implications drawn where a locality has accepted
federal funds for a project to clean the polluted waters adjacent
to its beaches? Surely the lack of popularity of sand pits as recreational areas suggests that clean water is, at the very least, as
important as the dry sand area and boardwalk to the concept of
a successful park. Why, then, should the use of federal funds in
such a manner not entitle federal taxpayers to the use of the
beach so improved? The utility of the federal funds argument
drops off where a locality receives federal funds, through Revenue
Sharing for example, and mingles those funds with those of its
own, thereby "washing" them. The application of federal monies
must be directly used for beach improvements for this theory to
operate. Since most grants will be for a particular purpose, however, this will not be much of a problem.
If it indeed proves axiomatic that public funds will mandate
public beaches, there will be many more public beaches in the
future. It should be noted that the majority of Long Island's
South Shore beaches are located on migrating sand islands known
as barrier beaches. Because of the prevailing westward longshore
drift, sand is continually being carried from the east end of Long
Island to the beaches close to New York City and then out into
the Hudson Canyon in the Atlantic Ocean. This condition has
caused the barrier islands to migrate. It is the natural state of
affairs for shorelines to change and inlets to be opened, close and
re-open at different points along the island chain. These islands
are also susceptible to storm damage as was dramatically demonstrated when a storm in the Spring of 1973 carried away a large
part of Gilgo Beach.
If the barrier islands had been permitted to remain in their
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natural state, no one would be bothered by a new inlet opening
or a beach receding. However, it must be realized that extensive
building has taken place on the barrier beaches. Indeed, whole
cities exist on them. The Rockaways, Long Beach and Atlantic
Beach are all built on the barrier islands. All along the South
Shore on both the barrier islands and that part of eastern Long
Island which fronts on the Atlantic Ocean extensive building has
taken place. Currently, there is a battle raging between the Suffolk County executive and the legislature over whether more jetties and groins are to be built to stabilize the beaches. The National Park Service has stated that it will not spend any more
money to save the Atlantic barrier beaches and in the end it will
come down to a question of priorities.
If the predictions of some coastal geologists are correct, we
can expect to see the thirty-story buildings of the Rockaway Peninsula begin toppling into the sea because of the erosion of the
beach there. Since the erection of a jetty cuts down on the amount
of sand a down-current owner will receive to maintain his beach
it is obvious that a single system is needed. While some people
argue that all the jetties must be removed, it is inconceivable that
nothing will be done to prevent whole cities from washing out to
sea. Because of the effect that the placement of jetties has, a
haphazard placement of them may prove more disastrous than
their total removal. It seems, therefore, that the only solution is
an island-long system of jetties to stabilize the beaches.
It should be remembered that in 1935, Long Beach sought
federal funds to assist it in stabilizing its beaches. It is unlikely
that the localities could finance the island-long system envisioned
by many geologists as the only hope of saving the beaches. Therefore, they will turn to the one governmental body which has the
money and the resources to do the job-the federal government.
A project sponsored by the federal government is currently
underway to replenish the sand lost at Gilgo Beach. Gilgo is a
Babylon Town Beach which, while not restricted to residents
only, does assess non-residents a rather stiff user fee while admitting residents free. Will Gilgo be the defendant in a suit to void
the discriminatory fees, based on the influx of federal money?
Time will tell and in this area time is on the side of those who
believe that federal money will mandate the opening of beaches.
The erosion situation is bad and it will continue to worsen unless
a unified plan is adopted. Unless they are willing to let billions
of dollars of investments float out to sea, the towns will have to
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accept the federal government as the prime financial backer of
that plan. The forces of nature and economics may turn out to
be the most powerful weapons in the open-beach advocate's legal
arsenal.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion has attempted to clarify many of
current theories employed by those seeking to open private or
restricted beaches to the general public, with particular references to beaches restricted to residents of towns under colonial
grant. While the colonial patents represent viable instruments in
aid of local government and are valid vis-a-vis the public trust
doctrine, they are not indestructible and the areas covered by
them may be susceptible to permit an opening for the general
public where the requisite facts are available.
The easement approach to the opening of closed patented
beaches presents technical common law difficulties and would
probably do little to force a change in the often restrictive administration of such beach facilities. A customary right in the nature
of a public easement, while avoiding many of the pitfalls of traditional easements, is a legal device which comes very close to being
contrived when set up against colonial patents which have been
recognized and upheld for three centuries.
Because of the relative inapplicability of these theories, the
notion of implied public dedication may be the preferable legal
device to open closed beaches where such opening would be desirable. Operating equally against patented and unpatented municipalities, the theory would represent an effective, if limited, approach to undoing restrictive or exclusionary ordinances without
much of the contrived reasoning that accompanies the traditional
common law theories.
The theory of the implied public dedication, may possibly be
effective in many Long Island locations; however, it may not be
preferable where, owing to great changes in the ocean littoral as
where colonial patents carried only to the high water mark, legal
changes in title may have followed the movement of sand. Most
importantly, the actions of wind and wave on patented South
Shore townships may necessitate the involvement of the federal
government. Acceptance by a municipality of such aid foreshadows an end to exclusionary ordinances. This is as it should be.
Colonial patents, while representing viable instruments of local
sovereignty, cannot be seen as enabling any town to rule by fiat

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1974

43

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 10

344

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 2, 1974]

or to be oblivious to the ramifications of federal aid by giving
nothing in return. Even patented minicipalities must be responsive to the pressures and needs not only of local residents but of
the state and nation as well.
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